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IntrQduction 
I've been interested in telling stories all my life. For a long time I made them up. 
But the more I read and learn, the more I value the way journalism and non-fiction tells a 
story. To print the words people say in a daily newspaper is to give that person power. 
Almost every journalist I meet tells me they love their job. I saw a slide show by 
a L.A. Times Pulitzer prize-winning photojournalist Carolyn Cole, and while she showed 
her pictures she said: 
Journalism is really not a job, it's a lifestyle and a passion. You have to 
know more and work harder to earn less money than in many other professions. 
Often you will work under a lot of pressure with little sleep, and if you are a 
photographer carry around a lot of heavy equipment while you're at it. You need 
to be resourceful, think logically, and have good people skills to capture pictures 
to tell the story. But, if you are good enough, those pictures and stories will move 
people, or teach them something they didn't know, or ultimately help someone, 
and you will have the satisfaction that brings. One of my favorite quotes is by 
Norman Mailer, who said about his writing, 'To extend human understanding is 
the most virtuous thing I could do.' That's why I strive to do my work. 1 
For a while I considered interviewing journalists in the United States to ask them 
about what they felt they accomplished on a day-to-day basis, to ask why they loved what 
they do. I am interested in the micro level where informing the average citizen brings 
about change, but I did not want to lose my focus in a gigantic analysis ofU.S media. 
I became interested in the politics of a free press and the role of the media in 
democracy after taking a class called Global Democratimtion. I realized my favorite 
definition of democracy hinged upon a developed civil society and a free press. The 
week we read one of de Tocqueville's first chapters in Democracy in America called 
"Freedom of the Press in the United States" I felt I had been given a gift. I had always 
1 Corolyn Cole, 3/02 
2 
valued newspapers as a part of society, but I had never studied or known there were 
theories about the media and the exchange of news. I've been curious ever since how 
newspapers and investigative reporting help consolidate democracy. When I found out 
newspapers were one of the World Development Report's selected indicators of 
development I wanted to conduct my own investigation. How is a newspaper different 
under an authoritarian government? What docs it mean that in Ethiopia there is only one 
newspaper per one thousand people?2 
More than thirteen hundred journalists have been killed since 1812 in the course 
of their professional work reporting the news.3 Independent journalists who write under 
totalitarian regimes, as part of WWII resistance, in Colombia or China, who do 
investigative reporting about people trafficking, sweat shops or prison conditions, are my 
heroes. 
I decided to study the influence of politics in the press in Latin America because 
most governments are settling into relatively new democracies, which means the 
beginnings of press freedom can be traced and studied within in the last 20 years. I went 
to Nicaragua in January of 2002 to see for myself how newspapers influence daily life. 
Even though my interviews and experiences are not necessarily a theme of this paper, my 
country choice was right on because a small body of research exists on newspapers and 
communication in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan civil war was possibly the most 
internationally analyzed war fought in Latin America, and Sandinista leaders Tomas 
Borge and Ernesto Cardenal considered mass communication a main forum for public 
2 Selected Human Development Report Indicaton, 2000/2001. 
3 Collings, Introduction 
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education. Also, many Marxist and leftist intellectuals world wide during the 1970s and 
1980s theorized about mass communication and class. 
In Nicaragua I interviewed locals I met, community organizers, ex-patriots, and 
international development workers. I asked questions about how organizations received 
information, what sources they trust, and if they read newspapers. Before going to 
Nicaragua I had read books about the Sandinista revolution, but I did not understand it. 
Now I have studied the revolution extensively from different sides, and really only 
conclude that history builds identity. This paper is for a large part historical because to 
tell the story of the press in Nicaragua I must write the history of the revolution, and to 
tell the story of the revolution explains contemporary Nicaragua. 
The other reason for the history in this paper is to illustrate that journalists in 
Nicaragua were witnesses of the war. Though Nicaraguan journalists were often shut out 
during the repressive periods of Sandinista leadership, and the U.S. refused for a long 
time to print the truth about the violence taking place, some of the developments of the 
war happened because of what reporters saw and sought. Reporters by definition must 
physically go to the scene of events and interview witnesses and participants which can 
be dangerous and taxing. In the tumultuous times of Nicaragua, the journalist that writes 
fairly and in depth about problems facing Nicaraguans is helping to consolidate 
democracy. 
4 
Paradoxically enough, but by a process familiar to students of mass movements, 
social revolutions apparently do not take place at the time when the reason for them 
appears to be most mgent. As long as the oppressed classes are completely ground under 
heel, as long as the masses are held under complete subjugation, nothing happens. It is 
only when the proletarians perceive that some other way of life is possible, only when 
they become acutely aware of the Contrast between their own situation and that of some 
other class, that ambitions are stirred and hopes revived. From then on revolt, the 
translation of predisposing factors and sufficient reasons into efficient causes, becomes 
largely a matter of the appearance of leaders. 
Eyler Simpson. The Ejido> Mexicos Way Out 1937 
I admit that I do not feel toward freedom of the press that complete and 
instantaneous love which one accords to things by their nature supremely good. I love it 
more from considering the evils it prevents than on account of the good it does. 
Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracv in America 1835 
Journalists have played an important role in the last thirty years of Nicaraguan 
history. When the story has broken, they have been there to write the changes down. In 
one sense there is no news until the story is published. But the role of the journalist in 
Nicaraguan is more than just a witness. To document a war is to be near the front line, 
and to be an editor in a civil war is to present politics to the people. 
There is only one way to begin to talk about newspapers in Nicaragua, and that is 
with the Chamorro family. Under Anastasio Somoza's dictatorship, Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro was editor and publisher of La Prensa until his death in 1978.4 The following 
historical synopsis relies heavily on the historical account of Nicaragua by Stephen 
Kinzer in Blood of Brothers. 
Chamorro's La Prensa was one of the only vocal institutions opposed to the 
family that had made the country their personal hacienda for the past 40 years. 5 The two 
families had feuded for decades and censorship of La Prensa was common. The only 
4 Kinzer20 
5 Guillennoprieto 36 
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thing that held Somoza back from shutting the paper down was his need to protect his 
international reputation. 6 
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro became the editor of La Prensa after the death of his 
father in 1952. During the 1950s, censorship by the Somoza regime was common 
knowledge. Once the paper once had to print a photo of Ava Gardner to fill the holes left 
from the illegal articles. The knowledge of censorship was so widespread that the 
newspaper hawkers would shout "La Prensa with Ava Gardner" in the streets so 
everyone would know the news had been censored by the government again. 7 
When President Anastasio Somoza Garcia was assassinated in 1956, the Somom 
family was certain Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was involved. The military occupied the 
office of La Prensa and the paper was accused of being involved in the assassination. 
From then on La Prensa strictly censored. 8 
The National Guard arrested Chamorro and he was kept in one of the rooms of the 
Somoza family home. He also spent time in a divided cage as part of the family zoo. Big 
cats were kept in the other half. Chamorro was kept as a political prisoner for five 
months, often tortured and beaten for hours. After his release he wrote a book about his 
experiences and copies were smuggled to Mexico. He then fled to Costa Rica with his 
wife, Violeta Chamorro, where he trained as a guerilla in the escalating movement 
against the Somoza dynasty. 9 
When Chamorro returned to Nicaragua he threw himself into working at La 
Prensa as well as a part of the anti-Somocismo movement He was just as vigorous and 
6 Kinzer20 
7 Kodirich 15 
1 Kodrich 15 
9 Kinzer 19 
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indignant as editor as in his guerilla days, pushing the government censors as much as 
possible. Chamorro delivered speeches and wrote militant editorials, and he soon came 
to be the Nicaraguans people's hero. 10 
Meanwhile the Sandinistas, who had begun training in the hills in 1961,11 had 
become such a threat in the late 1970s that a state of martial law was declared and 
censorship was very high. After the ban was lifted in 1977, La Prensa attacked (in print) 
the Somoz.a regime. La Prensa reporters traced Somoz.a to the theft of supplies donated 
by foreign governments after the 1972 earthquake. La Prensa printed a story about a 
company run by Somoz.a cronies that bought blood from poor people and sold it abroad. 
Somoz.a wrote in a letter at that time, "If I didn't make headlines my friends would say to 
me that Chamorro must be sick today."12 
Chamorro' s newspaper columns, even if they were directly attacking, were part of 
the Sandinista's intellectual conscious raising program. His editorials were framed as 
civics lessons; they talked about the duty of the individual in the face of evil or the nature 
of freedom. Chamorro coined several slogans in his columns that became battle cries of 
the revolution, one of them, "Sin libertad de Prensa, no hay libertarl'-. Without freedom 
of the press there is no liberty. 13 
Chamorro also wrote about the misery of the Nicaraguans living iri the country's 
interior. On his trips around Nicaragua he sparked anti-Somoza passions in the people he 
visited. In 1977 his fame officially reached across borders, he was awarded the Maria 
Moors Cabot Journalism prize by Columbia University. Nicaraguans considered him 
lOKinzer 20 
11 Guillermoprieto 30 
12 Kinzer 3 6 
13 Kinser 37 
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more than an editor and more than a politician. Many figured his moral authority would 
eventually carry him to the presidency.14 
Chamorro was not the only newspaperman working for social change. As the 
guerillas ttained in the hills, the media was also aiding the Sandinista movement. Edgar 
Barberena, reporter in the 1970's said, 
Many of us in the media would collaborate with the Sandinistas in their 
project to overthrow the Somozas. If you published or broadcast anything against 
the Somoza government, the National Security Office would call to announce that 
your equipment was going to be confiscated. You could also be killed. And so 
we would run a metro story that began, 'A taxi crashed into a bus at 9 a.m. on the 
comer of Roosevelt and Calle el Triunfo. The taxi driver's ID is available for 
family members to pick up at such and such a place in time ... And the rebels 
knew that this was a signal for where and when to meet that day.1' 
Journalist's became a united force in 1978 with the formation of La Union de 
Periodistas de Nicaragua (VPN), the Nicaraguan Journalists Union. The UPN 
clandestinely spread news by word of mouth, "speaking from the catacomb" where they 
occupied churches and read censored radio news from the pulpit. In 1978 the UPN 
founded Radio Sandino which played an essential role in organizing the combat that 
eventually overthrew Somoza in 1979. 16 
In an interview in 2002, the president of the union, Juan Alberto Henriquez 
Oporta, said of that time: 
The journalist union (union periodista) began exactly at the beginning of 
the anti-Somoza movement to oppose the journalists under Somoza. In 1978 
Sandinista journalists monopolized the union. The origin of the union is anti-
Somocista. Under Somoza there was censorship of the modes of communication. 
New in Nicaragua and new in Latin America was the questioning of censorship, 
14 Kimer36 
15 originally quoted in Pratt '99 
16 Mattelart 12, '86 
8 
directly from the population in communities and universities. [In 1978] the 
people got together and listened to the journalists [to find out] what was 
happening at the time. We worked in silence without newspapers to work for. So 
the Nicaraguan journalism of 1978 was either popular journalism [for Somoza], or 
that from the catacomb. No journalist at this time got [official] support from the 
university. Journalist and press sectors organized across the country, and with 
this impetus the anti-Somocista fight gained quantity. This is how the union of 
periodistas started. We were only non-militant Sandinistas. We are an 
organization of the revolution. It is certain we made the FSLN stronger. 17 
Consequently, journalists were known targets of Somoza and in 1978 he allegedly 
made a move that would bring the end of his tyranny. On January 10, 1978 Pedro 
Joaquin Chamorro was driving home from work when a pickup truck swerved in front of 
his car. Two men jumped out of the truck and shot him though the driver side window. 
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro immediately became a martyr. The case is still unresolved. 
Neither the identity of the assassins, nor who hired them, was ever thoroughly 
investigated. 
Most Nicaraguans blamed the Somoza regime, and thousands of angry mourners 
followed his body through the streets. Then rioters ransacked the city, targeting 
Somoza's national guard. One of their first targets was the blood company written about 
in La Prensa. Sandinista guerillas arrived and briefly took over parts of two Southern 
cities, Rivas and Granada. It took the National Guard two weeks to restore order, but it 
would not last. Chamorro's death had already sparked revolution.18 
In the months that followed there were guerilla uprisings in the hills, usually 
crushed by the National Guard, though small territories were gained. But on the morning 
of August 22, 1978 Sandinistas attacked the National Palace. They took several 
congressman as hostages, holding another 67 congressmen and members of the Somoza 
17 UPN Personal Interview 1/02 
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family at gunpoint. A La Prensa photographer had come with the Sandinistas, and that 
afternoon his startling photos covered the :front page.19 
Somoza eventually ended the siege by granting the guerillas their concessions. It 
took two days before he gave in, releasing Sandinista prisoners and paying a ransom to 
the FSLN. 20 This confrontation was not the end of Somoza's regime, but it was the 
beginning of the end and newspaper editors in the United States, unlike U.S. politicians, 
began to take Nicaraguan news quite seriously. Soonjournalists from the U.S, Europe 
and Latin America were a visible presence around Nicaragua. They were on sort of a 
death watch, counting the days until the country collapsed. Everyone assumed it was 
only a matter of time before the revolution began. 21 
In March of 1979, La Prensa was closed by the government when civil war 
erupted. In June, Somoza's Guardsmen attacked the building with an armored vehicle, 
gasoline and missiles. "He had destroyed a building," wrote Jaime Chamorro, Pedro 
Joaquin's sister, "but the spirit of Pedro Joaquin and La Prensa were soon resurrected out 
of the ashes."22 From here on the accounts of journalists as well as much of the 
contemporary press analysis later on relies heavily on the study completed by Kris 
Kodrich in 1998 called Tradition and Chan.0.e in the NicaragLlfill Press, published in 2002. 
In May and June of 1979 Sandinista fighters came up :from the south and down 
from the hills. There was fighting all over the country, but it was not until a single event 
happened that Somoza left Nicaragua. On the morning of March 20, television 
correspondent Bill Stewart, sent by ABC despite his inability to speak Spanish and his 
19 Kinzer40 
20 Kin7.er 41 
21 Kinzer43 
22 Kodrich 1 S 
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inexperience in dangerous situations, approached a National Guardsmen in a Managua 
slum. Stewart had footage of Sandinista soldiers, but he needed footage of Guardsmen so 
his crew drove him to a neighborhood where there had been street fighting. His crew 
waited in the van while Stewart went to talk to the Guardsmen. One of the Guardsmen 
pushed Stewart down, kicked him in the ribs and began to walk away. Then he turned 
back, went to where Stewart was lying, raised his M-16 and fired a single shot into his 
neck. Stewart died instantly. The Guardsman, realizing he had killed a gringo reporter, 
motioned for the van driver to come talk to him. The van driver promised the Guardsman 
he would say it had been a Sandinista sniper if they let them go free. The Guardsman 
agreed and the crew drove away.23 
The circumstances of Stewart's murder were instantly known at the 
Intercontinental Hotel, a place where all foreign media congregated. Somoza announced 
that the Sandinistas had killed Stewart and the journalists in the Intercontinental were 
furious. By evening, 40 prepared to leave Nicaragua because the risk of their work was 
too great. Later that night the case took a stunning turn. Stewart's cameraman had been 
parked a block away and had filmed the entire confrontation. The cameraman had kept 
the films existence secret until he could get safely out of the country. The footage, 
broadcast all over the world and into millions of homes in the United States, destroyed 
the little that what was left of Somoza's credibility.24 
Soon after, in June of 1979, the Sandinistas announced they had named a five-
member junta to serve as the next Nicaraguan government. The most famous member of 
the five at the time was the martyred editor's widow, Violeta Chamorro. The other 
23 Kinzer47 
24 Kinzer48 
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members were: Alfonso Rabelo, a young entrepreneur that had organized a series of anti-
Somoza business strikes; Moises Hassan, a math professor who held a doctorate in 
physics from North Carolina State University; Sergio Ramirez, a leftist writer and 
historian; and guerilla leader Daniel Ortega. The junta presented itself as a moderate 
group that would take the route towards representative democracy. 25 The new leaders' 
task was to construct a country from the wreckage. Nicaragua had extensive poverty, 
poor health care, as well as high unemployment, homeless and illiteracy rates. 26 
The junta members authority would change significantly as other Sandinista 
leaders and guerrillas gained power. Violeta Chamorro and Robelo would resign, 
Chamorro would turn against the party, and Robelo would be ostracimi as a greedy 
capitalist.27 The Sandinistas also began replacing the members of the junta's cabinet and 
the newly appointed congress with senior guerilla commandants. All the non-Sandinistas 
of the government were eventually pushed out of office. Banks and industries were then 
nationalized, food and rent prices were set and there was massive agrarian reform. 28 
The Sandinistas immediately confiscated all media that was connected with 
Somoza, as well as media later connected to the Contras. This included several radio 
stations and the Somoza press Novedades. The Novedades facilities were turned into a 
Sandinista press, Barricada, 29 and the state took control of nearly half of the country's 
radio stations. 30 In 1979 the Sandinistas hailed the re-opening of La Prensa as one of the 
25 Kinzer 49 
26 Kodricb 15 
27 Kimer 48 
28 Kodricb 1 S 
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first achievements of the insurrection, printing a front-page editorial in Barricada 
welcoming back La Prensa after its recovery from the National Guard's bombing.31 
The Sandinistas viewed mass communication as a tool for social reconstruction 
that should not be used for profit, 32 meanwhile making laws regarding what could and 
could not be said in the media .. One of their first laws prohibited degrading depictions of 
women as well as the commercial exploitation of women's bodies in advertising. 33 
The Sandinistas defended their censorship, saying that it was necessary because 
Nicaragua was particularly exposed to foreign broadcasting. The Sandinistas regarded 
most foreign media as psychological warfare, and their worry was not unsubstantiated. 
Nearly 80 radio stations and 15 U.S. television stations were accessible via bordering 
airways of Honduras and Costa Rica. 34 Links between the CIA and La Prensa would 
later be discovered.35 
Joaquin Cuadra, chief of staff of the Sandinista anny, defended the censorship 
saying, "Journalism has the right to be free, but it does not have the right to attack the 
process, even indirectly. 't36 Carlos Chamorro, editor of Sandinista Ba"icada, justified 
the censorship saying the newspaper "goes beyond political opposition and has 
subordinated itself to the United States policy of aggression against Nicaragua." His 
mother, Violeta Chamorro said, "Ironically, a revolution that began with the assassination 
of my husband, a free journalist, has brought with it the worst censorship that Nicaraguan 
journalism has ever endured. "37 
31 Valdivia 358 
32 Valdivia 358 
33 Kodrich 19 
34 Mattelart 13 
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But much that was censored was unrelated to the war: pictures of women, spoofs 
of the government, and or sports or food articles that had names similar to opposing 
leaders. Waiting for the censors was bad for business. It took time, and the holes left 
from the deleted portions had to be hurriedly filled. 
After the leftist newspaper El Pueblo criticized the FSLN for not moving quicker 
towards socialism, several staff members were put injail, the office was raided, and the 
paper had no other option than to shut down. 38 After the closure of Novedades and El 
Pueblo, La Prensa was the only remaining opposition newspaper, but the Sandinistas 
considered the printed attacks of the government insurgent, and considered closing La 
Prensa as well. 39 
The pressure from the government eventually resulted in the closing of the paper 
for a short time in August 1980. After serious ideological conflicts between editors and 
reporters Sandinista leaders were forced by international pressure to devise a compromise 
between the factions. La Prensa was allowed to reopen under the control of Violeta 
Chamorro and the leftover pro-Sandinista faction was given government help to establish 
a new socialist paper, Nuevo Diario.40 
Meanwhile, in March of 1980 the Sandinistas began its Adult Literacy Campaign. 
According to government figures, the illiteracy rate was reduced from 50 to 13 percent in 
five months. About 60,000 brigadistas, young people from the cities, went to remote 
areas to teach. In the cities 30,000 ''urban literacy guerillas" and 3,000 teachers taught 
half a million people to read and write. Within two years l, 100 new primary schools 
were built and the number of children enrolled increased from 36 percent in 1978 to 80 
31 Kodrich 21 
39 Kodrich 20 
40 Kinzer 30 
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percent in 1980. 41 Under Somoza the only literacy campaign had been a cover for a 
counterinsurgency investigation. He enlisted literacy teachers as spies to see if a child's 
parents were members or sympathizers with the FSLN.42 
During this time the Sandinistas were on good terms with President Carter. This 
would last about a year, during which the U.S. gave Nicaragua 75 million dollars in aid. 
After the Sandinistas broke an agreement by arranging for a Cuban weapons shipment for 
the rebels in El Salvador, the U.S. withdrew the aid. The Sandinistas tried to repair their 
mistake by immediately stopping their Salvadoran involvement, but it was too late, the 
fragile political bridge had been broken, and Reagan would soon take his presidential 
oath.43 
In his campaign Reagan made it clear he opposed Carter's policies, warning that 
he would not tolerate a Marxist Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua. Soon Contra soldiers 
were training in Florida. After failed negotiations between the Sandinistas and the 
Assistant Secretary of State in 1982 the CIA struck. Two bridges were blown up in 
Northern Nicaragua and the explosions had the mark of the CIA work.44 
William Casey, CIA Director, told congress the Contras were to stop Sandinista 
guerillas from shipping weapons up to El Salvador. Soon after, Reagan made a visit to 
Tegucigalpa. Honduras denied that any Contras were within its borders, but the 
government could not cover it up for very long.45 
In 1983 North American journalist Stephan Kinzer and photographer Ken 
Silverman were able to locate a secret Contra camp in Honduras, take pictures, and live 
41 Lllpple-Wagenhals 36 
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to see them published the next day on the front page of the New York Times.46 Congress 
was not in session that week and the U.S. State Department spokesmen denied the 
validity ofth.e story. But at that week's UN meeting, the ambassador to Poland brought 
Kinzer's article in his briefcase. The ensuing debate was challenging for the Honduran 
ambassador, who assured the UN council of his countries good faith, but did nothing to 
encourage the Contras to leave. 47 
Following that initial story, journalists went back to the now deserted area ofthe 
reported Contra camp. Reporters were able to find evidence of other camps and publish 
more stories with photographs. 48 The UN then officially recognized that there was more 
than psychological warfare happening on Honduran soil because there were American 
made automatic weapons, C-4 explosives, and automatic grenade launchers in the hands 
of the Contras. The evidence was brought into light on the world stage. Statements from 
the Honduran ambassador and the U.S. State Department denying military involvement 
were printed in the same articles as the UN accusations. 49 
Daniel Ortega, the leader of the Sandinistas, was elected president in 1984. His 
political platform only worsened relations with the U.S. Ortega spoke vehemently 
against the U.S. at his rallies, calling Reagan a death machine and crying "Sandino 
forever!" Not soon after Ortega's election Reagan began his second term as president, 
bringing with him vows from senators and CIA agents to end the Sandinista regime. The 
fighting escalated, the Sandinistas appealed to the Cubans for help, false Soviet 
46 Kinzer 111 
47 Kinzer 112 
41 Kinzer 113 
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involvement was advertised to U.S. citizens, and the Contras' funding subsequently 
increased. There was tension all over the country, stores in the cities were void of 
supplies, roads were frequently closed, and the death toll was climbing in many areas. so 
Because of the civil war, the Sandinistas were able to declare a state of 
emergency, restricting political and press rights. They were specifically concerned about 
rumors of CIA involvement with La Prensa. 51 In the early years of the Sandinista 
government the approval process for La Prensa took about two hours, by 1986 it was 
taking 7. The paper was on shaky financial ground, by the time it hit the streets at night 
the news was old and diluted. 52 The Sandinistas considered their censorship necessary 
to protect Nicaragua from the CIA infiltration. However, their censorship would spiral 
out of control, helping to destroy the public validity and confidence in the Sandinista 
government. 
Besides censorship, there was a concentrated campaign from Minister of Interior 
Tomas Borge to sabotage La Prensa. He initiated cutbacks in paper supply, reduced 
foreign allocations needed to buy ink, and even intimidated the venders who sold the 
newspaper on the street. But Sandinista suspicions would turn out to be true. U.S. 
Journalist John Spicer Nichols was able to uncover through the Freedom of Information 
Act that the CIA had not only provided funding for press and supplies, but also 
financially reimbursed pro-Contra editorials in U.S. newspapers. In the Columbia 
Journalism Review Nichols concludes, "The record clearly shows that most U.S. aid to 
'°Kinzer 248 
52 Kodrich 19 
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La Prensa was an integral part of the campaign to help the Contras overthrow the 
Sandinista government. "53 
In June of 1986 the House of Congress approved $100 million in military and 
humanitarian aid for the Contras. La Prensa was shut down the next day by the 
Sandinistas and stayed closed for the next year. 54 
Despite the censorship, mass communication was considered to play a 
''fundamental role in this society, in the construction of a new society," said N elba 
Blandon, director of the Sandinista government's communications department in 1980. 
The department emphasized the cultural significance of the mass media and recogniz.ed 
information and communication as social goods and not as merchandise. Most important 
to the Sandinista government, was the collaboration with and the service of the interests 
of the people.55 
Espinoza, the director of the journalism school during the 1980s, said that 
communication "is also form of pressure from the social classes," and that the 
Nicaraguanjournalist "has to be an organiur and a leader." In 1982 Espinoza referred to 
the training at his school as new saying, "Before, journalism was sensational. Our 
present-day journalism is polemic and critical. Our preoccupation is now to make a 
journalism which is more serious, more responsible, more truthful. "56 
Initially one of the Sandinista's core values was keeping channels of contact with 
the government open. Because the population during the beginnings of the revolutionary 
government was highly organized, direct dialogue was able to take place between 
53 Valdivia 362 
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politicians and citizens. Political leaders often traveled throughout the countryside and 
talked with the population. At the grass roots level, the heads of unions were considered 
caveats for the public voice and were required to know what channels of organi7.8tions to 
go through to communicate with the government. 57 As the war wore on this tiered 
system would eventually be the Sandinista's downfall. Lower-level party cadres would 
be afraid to give bad news to their superiors, and mid-level party officials were 
insufficiently trained therefore the government was left uninformed. 58 
One of the ways the Sandinista government tried to stay in touch was by a special 
radio program, Linea Directa, where citizens could call in and ask politicians questions 
on the air. There was also a television program.Al cara del pueblo, (With the face of the 
people/town) where Sandinista leaders went to the countryside and had discussions with 
citizens in rural areas. The government also frequently held press conferences and 
interviews with domestic and foreign journalists. This new model of participation, 
contrary to the vertical model in place during the Somoza regime, was intended to create 
open access and participation from the popular sectors. 59 
But the Sandinistas would make a lot of mistakes and lose their international 
credibility as well as trust from Nicaraguans. Believing there was a directed CIA effort 
in the Miskito region on the Atlantic coast near the Honduran border, the Sandinistas 
relocated tens of thousands of Creole and Native Indians to new lands, burning their 
crops and villages so the Contras would be unable to profit from them. Reagan 
57 Llpple-Wagenhals 116 
51 Gillermoprieto 36 
59 Ll!.pple-Wagenhals 40 
19 
sensationalized the Sandinista's removal of the Miskitos from their ancient homeland, 
using their displacement as a platform for U.S. involvement.60 
The government lost most of its popular support with the implementation of the 
draft. Sandinista trucks would come into villages and towns unannounced and take all 
the young men away.61 During the war over 300,000 people joined the army, more than 
10 percent of the population. 62 The fighting destroyed national agriculture since farms 
became war zones and men were fighting instead of tending their land. Many schools 
and cooperatives were destroyed in the fighting, and hundreds of schools were shut down 
for years. In the mid 1980s, 35 percent of the national budget went towards the Army, 
and the cost of treating the wounded was left up to the families. 63 Attacks from Costa 
Rican and Honduran Contra bases killed an estimated 40 thousand, weakened 
infrastructure and drove the country further into economic crisis. 64 
Real progress towards peace did not begin until August of 1987 when President 
Oscar Arias of Costa Rica engineered Central American peace talks that included only 
the presidents of all Central American countries. Though the talks were for all of Central 
America, Arias specifically intended to reach peace in Nicaragua. The five governments 
signed an accord in which they pledged to permit full political and press freedom, hold 
periodic elections monitored by the UN and the OAS, the Organization of American 
States. Countries with deep social divisions were committed to begin dialogueue 
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between the opposing sides and all "states of emergency" were to be lifted. All countries 
were to enter cease-fire negotiations and offer amnesty to enemies. 65 
The accord specifically stated that, 
The governments of the five Central American states will ask governments in the 
region, and extra-regional governments which openly or covertly provide 
military, logistical, financial, or propaganda aid in manpower, arms, munitions, 
and supplies to irregular forces or insurrectional movements, to cease such aid, as 
an indispensable element in the achievement of stable and lasting peace. 66 
To Ortega, these negotiations were concessions, the "bourgeoisie democracy" the 
Sandinista's had always scorned, but it meant the Contras would be forced to leave.67 
There were many issues and reasons for the war, but when journalist Stephen 
Kinzer interviewed Arias later, the president pointedly said, "The lesson of history is so 
clear," and spread his palms out and up at the sky, ''No Communist system can survive 
without the freedom of the press, ''68 proving that though censorship may not necessarily 
have resulted in the loss thousands oflives lost, it inherently damaged the government's 
reputation. 
But the accord's stipulations did not happen overnight. Shortly after its signing 
an anti-Sandinista rally was violently broken up by the police. A few months after the 
accord Reagan proposed to Congress that the U.S. give $270 million dollars aid to the 
Contras, but it did not pass. 69 The terms of the peace accord were that it had to be 
enforced within ninety days. In September the Catholic radio station was reopened but 
the radio station was forbidden to broadcast news. The Sandinistas also refused to let 20 
65 Kinzer 350 
66 Kinzer 35 1 
67 Kinzer 351 
H Kinzer352 
69 Kinzer 353 
21 
radio programs that had been closed since 1982 back on the air, and ignored requests for 
a non-Sandinista television station. 70 
However on October 1, 1987, following the conditions of the peace accord, La 
Prensa printed its first edition after 16 months of closure. The paper immediately began 
printing attacks on the government. These attacks renewed Sandinista charges that La 
Prensa was collaborating with the U.S. government These charges were not far from the 
truth; La Prensa editors openly admitted they received $98,000 from the National 
Endowment of Democracy, a congressionally funded foundation serving Reagan's 
international goals, to purchase ink and supplies. 71 
But media disagreements were not the only disputes left to settle. There was still 
no ceasefire. On March 23, 1989, a press conference was called. On the stage were 
senior Sandinista leaders Daniel Ortega and Humberto Ortega along side Contra leaders 
Adolfo Calero and AlfredQ Cesar. The OAS secretary general read to the crowd of 
reporters that a ceasefire had been reached. The news was immediately picked up by the 
radio and spread across Nicaragua and the world. 72 After that, the fighting stopped. The 
soldiers walked through the abandon and destroyed country back to their homes, if they 
were still there, to find who was left of their families. 
Riding on the success of the peace talks, and to prove Nicaragua was truly a 
democracy, Ortega announced that the new democratic election would be held early. 
Ortega ran as the Sandinista candidate, his campaign was well choreographed and 
funded. Violeta Chamorro was chosen as the opposition candidate, her campaign was 
modest and her rallies poorly attended. She won with 55 percent of the vote. 
70 Kinzer 357 
71 Kodrich 21 
72 Kinz.cr 353 
22 
The Sandinistas could not have conceived their defeat, but Nicaraguans were tired 
of the destitution and loss from a war that had lasted over a decade. It was also 
widespread knowledge in Nicaragua that if Ortega won the U.S. would continue 
supporting the Contras. Ortega gave his final speech and peacefully turned over the 
presidency to Chamorro. 73 
With the election of Violeta Chamorro, press freedom became more of a reality 
than ever before in history. But even under Chamorro a Sandinista news program was 
suspended after being accused of inciting strikers. In 1995, constitutional reform made it 
illegal for the government to confiscate equipment from the newspaper, radio, or TV 
news offices. 74 During her seven years in office Chamorro worked toward consolidating 
democratic institutions, making peace with the Contras, reducing the size of the army 
from 96,000 to 15,000, and welcoming back Nicaraguans that had fled abroad."75 The 
government privatized more than 3 50 state enterprises, reduced inflation and cut foreign 
debt in half. The economy :finally began expanding in 1994; and GDP reached nearly 2 
billion in the mid 1990s.76 
In 1996 Managua Mayor Arnoldo Aleman Lacayo, leader of the center-right 
liberal alliance, was elected president. His main pledge was to increase economic 
activity with foreign investors, but he eventually became hated by most of the population 
for his corruption, specifically the misuse of Hurricane Mitch foreign aid. His vice 
president, Enrique Bolanos, was elected to the presidency in 2002. 
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The 20th anniversary of the Sandinista revolution has passed. Now this paper will 
take a contemporary look at the war's influence on the press today, consider the present 
politics that confront newspapers, and analyze the role of the journalist in the transition 
and consolidation of democracy. 
History has created a dual identity for the Nicaraguan journalist as a revolutionary 
and as writer. The past censorship brought tremendous international criticism, at the 
same time it has been heavily analyzed. Many scholars believe the censorship was 
necessary to protect Nicaragua from the CIA, some suggest that the limiting of press 
freedom brought the downfall of the Sandinistas. The correct level of access to 
information during times of war is not what this paper is about, but rather how diversity 
in publications is part of democracy. This paper will also examine in-depth reporting 
because it can be a reflection of society and crucial to forming national identity. 
In 2002 there are five circulating daily newspapers in Managua. There are also 
weekly newsmagazines, tabloids and business news supplements. There are a variety of 
publication styles: traditional or cutting edge, color or black and white, with coverage of 
business, gossip or both. The newspapers are all trying to find the magic combination of 
coverage and image to fill the biggest niche in the market. La Prensa is the first 
Nicaraguan paper to publish the Wall Street Journal as a weekly supplement.77 In the 
top right hand comer ofibw.com, Nicaragua's national web page, the media links are 
displayed. Noticias y Medios Escritos (News and Written Media) has direct web links to 
daily newspapers La Pre11Sa, Nuevo Diario, and Confidencial, as well as several Weekly 
newspapers, and Central and North American dailies. Under the media icon there are 
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links to Nicaragua's main businesses, NGO's, tourism, investment, government, 
entertainment, schools and health. 78 
This relative quantity of information available is an interesting contrast to the 50.3 
percent of people in Nicaragua living below the poverty line. In rural areas 76.1 percent 
of the population live below the poverty line. Illiteracy has climbed back up to 31 
percent.79 
The total circulation of all newspapers according to UNESCO is 135,000, but the 
projection by the Universidad de Central America is much smaller. In 1999 the UCA 
said El Nuevo Diario sold about 15,000 copies a day, La Prensa 13,000 and La Tribuna 
3,500.80 Per 1000 people, 30 daily newspapers are purchased,81 down from 50per1000 
in 1990.82 A daily newspaper is unaffordable to most of the population, costing three 
cordobas, about .35 cents depending on the exchange rate. La Prensa and Nuevo Diario 
continue to dominate the market. 
During the war circulation was much higher. In 1982, La Prensa reportedly sold 
70,000 copies a day, Nuevo Diario (sympathetic to the FSLN) 35,000, and Barricada (the 
official paper of the FSLN) 35,000. Readership began to fall dramatically after 
Chamorro's economic restructuring in the early 1990's, with the fall of purchasing 
power.83 Newspapers are trying to survive in a place where illiteracy rates are high and 
the average income is $420.84 
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Part of the decrease in circulation is a product of post-democratic transition. In 
many cases after democratic transition, political participation declines. 85 When there is 
no more war to read about people stop buying papers. People start living their lives as 
individuals instead of factions, and focus on themselves, not their country. 
Circulation of newspapers is low because of other competing media sources. 
Television and radio broadcasts are much more accessible by the rural population. 
According to one survey newspapers are less appealing to Nicaraguans than listening to 
the radio or TV. UCA professor Alfonso Malespin said that only 11 percent of 
Nicaraguans choose newspapers as their preferred news source. He summarized that 
newspapers must increase their circulation to financially survive, and therefore Nicaragua 
can really only support two newspapers. 86 
With the number of TV and radio stations, new publications, supplements and 
internet links, there are not enough readers and advertisers to go around. 87 Union 
Periodista Nacional (UPN) President Henriquez describes the limited media market 
saying, 
"There are too many conditions [on journalists]. Our numbers are small 
and businesses have so many demands on them from the economy and the state 
that they are not able to utilize, maintain, and sustain relations with the media and 
modes of communication such as cable television, radio and small broadcasts." 88 
According to the UPN, poor economic conditions and advertising pressures had closed 
more than 40 information spaces, specifically radio and news programs. 89 
15 Fitzsimmons & Anners in "Civil Society in a Post-war period ... " The study of post-transtion political 
decline originates with Schmitter and O'donnell. 
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Unemployment in Nicaragua from official sources hovers around 20-40 percent; 
unofficially Nicaraguans say it has been at times 70 percent. If unemployment is in fact 
only 20 percent, underemployment affects at least another 60 percent. 90 According to the 
National Board of the Nicaraguan Journalists Union, 550 out of 1,050 journalists were 
unemployed or underemployed. 91 According to some sources, journalists in Nicaragua 
are the poorest paid in Latin America. 92 
Though economic conditions are impossible to ignore, the number of newspapers 
and information sources in Nicaragua is a signal of some democratic success. Some of 
the progress for Nicaraguan journalists and newspapers, as well as Nicaraguan 
democracy, has come from the softening the Nicaraguan tradition of partiality in news 
coverage. 93 La Prensa now has several reporters that once worked for Barricada, the 
Sandinista opposition paper during the '80s. 94 Says current editor of La Prensa, Eduardo 
Enriquez, "In the last decade we've learned a lot as journalists here in Nicaragua. Before 
the press was very political and party-driven. Now, people have shown that they want a 
serious, independent and professional press ... one that helps the co.m.m.unity."95 Without 
the oppressive umbrellas of Somocismo and Sandanismo, the journalist and the 
newspaper is a different kind of actor in society. 
According to the president of the journalist union, Alberto Henriquez, the union is 
a professional organization as opposed to a political one. Some members are leftist, 
others conservative or mainstream. "From the point of the view of the journalist we are 
9° CIA world fact book says 20 percent in 2001, Benda says 40 percent in 1999, personal interview with 
Horold Urbina Cruz says 80 percent in 2002. 
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the best journalists in the country and there are almost no other journalists than us. We 
are the graduates, professionals."96 The post-war professionalism of journalism is 
similar in its importance to the professionalism of cops or the military in making the 
transition to democracy. A non-partisan union is important to providing a non-
discriminating work environment across Nicaragua. Less party influence on the 
journalist means there are employees for all types of publications in Nicaragua, papers 
that are known for supporting one political side like Nuevo Diario and others that are 
more politically objective like La Tribuna. The Nicaraguan can then make the choice of 
what view they want to rea.ci. 
Some international groups are working to aid journalistic professionalism through 
increased training,97 but workshops alone do not affect the root of the problem. 
Democratic theorist Thomas Carothers writes about the pressures that take away from the 
possibilities of more in-depth reporting: 
With the media sector, these conditions usually include persistent state 
dominance of television, ingrown structures of ownership in what private media 
does exist, rising pressure for sensationalism with increased commercialization of 
the sector, and an inadequate advertising base due to the countries economic 
troubles. Training courses may make journalists more knowledgeable and 
skillful, but they will not ameliorate these negative factors.98 
Since 1990, the country's first democratic election, Nicaragua has had no serious 
cases of press freedom violations. Under Chamorro, the Nicaraguan press received praise 
from the Inter American Press Association, a nonprofit organization dedicated to 
defending press freedom throughout the Americas. The Nicaraguan press system was 
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said to operate freely and effectively with less problems than would be expected in an 
underdeveloped country with new democratic institutions. 99 
The Nicaraguan public now considers the media to be one of the country's most 
credible institutions. One study found the media a more trusted institution than the 
Catholic Church. In a 1998 survey of 360 random Managua homes in 30 different 
neighborhoods, 75 percent of those surveyed thought the mass media was credible 
compared to 68 percent for the Catholic Church. The government comptroller was 
thought to be credible by 65 percent of those surveyed, the National Police 54 percent, 
National Assembly 49 percent, and the presidential office 47 percent. 
This pattern can be seen all across Latin America: the Catholic Church and the 
press typically have the most public confidence. The support is mainly due to the 
exposure of government corruption by joumalists.100 This public sentiment is echoed in 
the words of La Tribuna columnist Wilfredo Montalvan when he says "In a democratic 
system, such as the one we are trying to consolidate in Nicaragua, freedom of expression 
is considered a cornerstone or backbone of democracy. This is true, for without freedom 
of expression there can be no democracy."101 
But support from the public sector is not the same as cooperation from the 
government. There are still significant conflict and power struggles between the media 
and the government. The government claims the media is constantly trying to tarnish its 
achievements and reputation. In March newspapers reported that Byron Jerez, Director 
of General Revenues, had written fraudulent checks totaling almost a half a million U.S. 
dollars. Three months later, after conducting a four~month investigation, weekly 
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newspaper Confldencial reported Jerez allegedly built a summer home with funds 
earmarked for Hurricane Mitch assistance. Soon after that story was printed Jerez was 
fired.102 As a result, tax authorities harass media and television organizations. In August 
of2002 the government attempted to collect $500,000 from La Prensa in tax penalties. 
The fines were the result of La Prensa 's audit 1999, shortly after they published a report 
on government corruption. 103 
At the same time, journalists are working with the government to pass a law that 
gives them legal protections and a higher living wage. In February of2000, President 
Aleman announced during his weekly radio broadcast from a government station that his 
administration planned to pass a minimum wage law for journalists. Ley 372 was tabled 
after media owners protested strongly. The UPN then worked with the government to 
rewrite the law so it would not limit rights to somce access or discourage independent 
reporting by requiring all journalists to register with the national colegio, but the law was 
passed without modifications. Journalists argued that the unrestricted and low wages 
encouraged journalists to sell advertisements to politicians and businessmen for favorable 
coverage.104 
Many journalists are discouraged by working long hours for little pay. According 
to a survey by Kris Kodrich in 1998of62 Nicaraguan journalists, 53 percent of reporters 
worked eight to ten hours a day and 28 percent said they worked more than ten hours a 
day. Reporters and photographers usually worked for 12 consecutive days and then had a 
weekend off earning between $300 and $500 a month. Nicaraguans consider U.S. $500 
enough to live modestly. Comparatively, schoolteachers make about U.S. $100 a 
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month. tos In the new era of journalism, like in the days of CIA infiltration, the reporter 
is still tempted to take offers from businesses that will pay him or her extra to print 
favorable news. 
The integrity of the journalists is not the only thing to be compromised by 
economic gain. The PLC led government is the country's largest advertiser. This means 
advertising revenues are potentially affected by whether or not a newspaper's editorial 
stance pleases the government. In August of 2000 La Prensa denounced the government 
tax agency for placing 6.4 times more advertising in the official newspaper La Noticia 
even though La Prensa 's circulation was ten times that of La Noticia. In September 2000 
President Aleman promised that political criteria would no longer influence state 
advertising policy.106 
While the press's uncovering of government misconduct is necessary to provide 
political transparency and consolidate democracy, official sources such as the 
government, press conferences and experts, are almost solely relied upon. 107 In other 
words, the media has not yet transgressed to writing about non-traditional sources like the 
daily struggles of individuals and communities. 
For Nicaraguan journalists to make the transgression to investigative reporting 
that upholds democratic as well as journalistic ethics like fairness in reporting, journalists 
need more resources to more fully cover their stories and use their time effectively. 
Reporters spend many of their working hours waiting for rides. Buses don't go 
everywhere newsworthy events happen, and journalists cannot necessarily afford the taxi 
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fare. 108 Though the offices have phones, phone service and the delivery of messages is 
unreliable. For one reason or another people don't call back. Rural areas and poor areas 
of Managua have no phone lines. Nor does the average family in Managua. For every 
one thousand people, there are only 31 phone lines in Nicaragua. In 2001 cell phone use 
was only four people per thousand.109 
One North American NGO worker has described the communication process in 
Nicaragua as difficult. Sara Woodard, Jubilee House Community hassaid: 
To work here you must assume that nothing has really gone through, you 
get wrong numbers and your emails don't mail, but they don't bounce back. The 
dilemma is whether to call back and harass, or is their silence a way of saying no? 
It makes life complicated, just when you think you got a system that works some 
leg of the communication breaks down. 110 
Internet use is even more out of reach than telephones. In January of 2001, there 
were 2.04 Internet hosts per 10,000 people. 111 At newspaper offices there arc usually one 
or two computers with Internet access, but the computers are often tied up since the entire 
staff shares them. 112 
Communication in Nicaragua operates at a human level: word of mouth. In 
tropical Nicaragua people spend a lot of time in their neighborhood streets, and this is 
how information is passed. When I talked to Nicaraguan community organi7.er "Shaggy" 
Horold Urbina Cruz, he said: 
In every neighborhood we visit people in their own houses and invite them 
to come [to the party meeting, or English class]. It is the only way to get the 
message. Sometimes we use media or publicity, but it is not so easy to get to a TV 
channel and go on the air. There are a few radio stations let us on the air ... 
Communication is something difficult, when I worked [at an organi7.8tion with a 
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phone] it was easy to call a radio station and denounce something. Most people 
have no radio, no TV and are always depending on personal communication and 
always visiting neighborhood ... All organizations know each other, members are 
from communities, neighbors. 113 
From a development standpoint word of mouth is bad for business, implying 
delays and misinformation. It is possible that newspapers could alleviate some 
miscommunications with more in-depth coverage and diversity in reporting. 
Newspapers coverage of the human rights issues Urbina is working for would help his 
fight for social justice. Through public exposure the entrenched problems of Nicaragua 
and Latin America like human rights violations, lack of full equality and opportunity for 
women, ecological damage and the gap between the rich and the poor, 114 could be further 
understood and the country less susceptible to exploitation. This assumption is 
optimistic, relying on the hope that knowledge alone will make what is best for society 
possible. 
The role of the media in democracy as defined by the USAID Center for 
Democracy and Governance is: 
For example the support for media may yield results in governance 
activities, particularly those related to decentralization, anti-corruption, and 
citizen participation in the policy process. The rule of law may be further 
institutionalized by support for an independent media that keeps a check on the 
judiciary, reports on the courts, and promotes a legal enabling environment 
suitable for press freedom. 
The danger of linking media to government transparency is that reporters will rely 
too heavily on official sources. The decline in political participation typical to post-
democratic transition can result in a barrage of messages from the competing parties, 
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drowning out popular sentiments leaving citizens cynical. 115 The media as a societal 
apparatus has the potential to bridge the popular and political sphere. Kodrich's survey 
has showed that story ideas mainly came from coverage of meetings, press conferences 
and faxes that came in throughout the day. More investigative reporting will take more 
than an ideological shift in the media sector, but will depend on better use of resources by 
journalists, better training at Universities, and further access to resources. 116 It is also 
important to consider the editorial choices of the newspapers themselves. Editors assign 
certain stories according to how they view society and by what readers want. In this 
sense it is very good that Managua has five dailies even though the economy cannot 
support them all. The editorial choices of two people would not be sufficient to represent 
all reader's views. 
USAID specifically mentions in its progress report for Nicaragua in 2000 that 
"civil society must be given more systematic avenues of expression (public hearings, for 
example)." 117 Part of the work of an editor for a newspaper with the intent to help build 
civil society is to create a systematic avenue of expression for the public. Part of the 
difficulty is getting society to consider the press a viable apparatus as a space for the 
representation of their concerns. 
The Sandinista Minister of Interior Tomas Borge Martinez wrote in 1984 that: 
[M]edia must open themselves more to the popular project, creatively and 
without falling into either populism or empiricism. At the same time, we should 
deepen our own marginal experiences and sensitize all of society which is not 
conscious of the importance of communication, the transcendent importance of 
the dissemination apparatuses in the building of a new society. In Nicaragua we 
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are fully aware of the military defense apparatus, as we should be, but we are not 
aware of the role of communication.118 
The freedom the media apparatus operates under is key to Martinez's statement. 
Freedom House rates Nicaragua's press freedom, considering similar avenues in civil 
society as USAID. Nicaragua rates as only ''partly free," with a rating of 40, where 1-30 
is free, and 31-60 is partly free and 60-100 is not free. In Latin America 52 percent (17) 
of countries are rated free, 42 percent (14) are partly free and 6 percent (2) are not free. 
Freedom House reports that worldwide press manipulation is becoming more subtle.119 
The USAID report in 2000 summarized Nicaraguan "Political Participation, 
Compromise and Transparency" as 
Progress towards objectives is not meeting expectations. Political 
participation may be adversely affected by the implementation of power-sharing 
agreement between the two dominant political parties, and by related legal and 
constitutional reforms. Progress is slow on decentralization and resolution of 
property cases, and there continues to be inadequate transparency in government 
operations. 120 
"Inadequate transparency in government" means information about what the 
government does is not truly circulating. If news coverage is dominated by press 
conferences, meetings or public hearings, and USAID says there needs to be more public 
hearings, then the press is reinforcing the limited reach of the government by printing 
only their limited range of news. However, it is not the sole responsibility of the press to 
provide transparency in government. The press would not have strive to expose 
corruption if the political system was more transparent. 
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Nicaraguan media needs to provide more spaces for civic dialogue wirelated to 
politics. More human-interest or daily-life type sections will help develop a more plural 
political identity in the current two-party polarity which pushes political beliefs and the 
identifications of organization to either the left or right. In larger, economically 
boundless nation-states, the quantity of independent media creates a sort of freedom 
through capitalism since there are more niches available in the market that make it 
possible to avoid direct political and advertising pressures. Unfortunately economic 
opportunity cannot really be chosen. In the United States the sheer number of 
publications available because of its physical siz.e, ethnic diversity, and economy creates 
many more dialogic spaces. Tight economic conditions in Nicaragua mean less mobility 
for Nicaraguans to communicate and reflect on identity. 
If radio stations and newspapers are partial to the left or right they are 
contributing to the politicalization of national spaces because of the limited number of 
newspaper and radio stations. That is not to say that the two opposing political parties 
are not part of Nicaraguan identity. Centraliz.ed politics would not be an improvement if 
they result in a press reflective of only the center. Theoretically responsible economic 
development, time for political diffusion so that governments and parties can be more 
receptive, increased training and resources for journalists to do investigative reporting, 
more identity "spaces" in civil society would aid democratic consolidation. 
Silvio Waisboard argues that 
The role the media play in identity building needs to be examined by 
analyzing how citiz.enship is created and recreated in local situations. Identity 
formation has been intrinsically linked to participation in local and national 
politics. In this sense citizenship continues to be grounded in Earticular historical 
conditions and locally and nationally defined political spaces. 1 
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For Nicara~s to advance from the boundaries of a history that requires citiz.enship to 
be defined by political identification, it is necessary to dissuade immediate monologic 
categorization and labeling of civil society's participants to ensure that public space 
contains diverse opinions protected by the law and invigorated by a free press. 
This is not to say that a Nicaraguan identity needs to be built. Nicaraguan identity 
already exists, it is full of the contradictions and evolutions, like I have begun to outline 
in the Nicaraguan press, that resist the reductionism traditionally practiced in political 
science, cultural theory and anthropology until recently in singular colonialist models. 
Journalism in Nicaragua has also only recently come out of colonization, first by the 
Spanish, then by Somocismo and Sandanismo. That does not mean the press or the 
population have always followed the direction of the power holders. Instead, there is a 
history of finding non-traditional outlets, like the press of the catacombs, where civic 
dialogue happens. It has been a little more than ten years for new journalistic practices to 
grow from the traditional, blend with the international, and become Nicaragua's own. 
Cultural theorist Marc Zimmerman explains where Nicaraguan identity is located 
amongst the contradictions when he writes, 
In Central America, as in other regions of the postcolonial world, 
intellectuals and bodies of ideas are not necessarily of the same sorts or located in 
the same places as in the metropolitan centers ... but in an informal literary public 
sphere constituted, often quite haphazardly and precariously, by journals, 
newspapers, editorials, manifestos, tracts, letters, testimonios and memoirs ... 122 
Diversity in news and range of available media sources in Nicaragua play a role in 
Zimmerman's depiction of infonnal Central American identity, but it is likely that the era 
of the newspaper's importance to civil society has passed. The important political role of 
122 Zimmerman 
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the press during the late 1970's and the high circulation rates throughout the 1980's were 
probably the peak for the Nicaraguan press. Zimmerman goes on to argue that the 
current forum for Central American identity is poetry. Though this paper has focused on 
the press, the future societal space where dialogue and identity reflection will probably 
not occur through newspapers. The written word on the page will always have power 
and be able to create change, but will always be less accessible, entertaining and 
immediate than radio or television, especially with a large illiterate population. 
What is important to recognize about the press in Nicaragua despite a poor 
economy or significant illiteracy is that the media still represents various voices simply 
by the sheer number of publications available that represent diverse beliefs. The concern 
offered in this analysis is that the market-economy in Nicaragua will become so tight and 
fraught with exploitive foreign influence that more media spaces will be lost. Further, if 
Nicaraguan politics become more centered instead of the current left and right dichotomy 
less civic dialogue will be stimulated and the activity of civil society will lessen in 
centrist apathy. Zimmerman's point that Nicaraguan intellectual bodies will find their 
own forms specific to Nicaraguan culture provides hope that this bleak prospect of 
centrist societal deadening is not in the near future. Also when considering this 
disheartening prediction for a Nicaragua bereft of discourse, it is important to remember 
that across Latin America there is no tradition of political apathy, and throughout history 
political developments are consistently unpredictable. 
The Nicaraguan journalist has already secured a role in history as a hero. I have 
no doubt journalists will forget their history or disappear as civic actors. There will 
always be journalists that investigate and write to convey objective informative truth, just 
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like there will always be doctors and artists that want to heal or create. Readers will not 
stop reading and writers will not stop writing. We are currently in an "information age" 
where life is being more analyzed by the day. How this affects lesser-developed 
countries is still being understood and the availability of infonnation is intrinsic to the 
current trend of international development aid. 
Globalization has brought the information age for both rich and poor countries, 
but this does not necessarily mean increased freedom or better living conditions 
Economics are still the biggest detennining factor. Nor does globalization mean that 
country identity will be diluted by international exchange. How and which other sources 
besides economics will influence culture is more my question. 
The limitations of freedom in Nicaragua's past, as well as other dictatorships and 
controlled societies worldwide, have taught us that no matter what agenda a government 
purports, be it egalitarian or exploitative, if the government is at the point where it must 
censor the press in order to protect its power it is doomed to failure. At the micro level, it 
is the job of the jolll'llBlist and the editorial board of the newspaper, no matter what 
sweeping movement takes the country, to stay objective and present balanced news to the 
public. Since news sources will always have their own agendas, like La Prensa and 
Nuevo Diario 's known political stances, it is necessary for society to support a number of 
media sources so information can conflict and in the contradictions a truthful news 
portrayals is available for anyone who wants to find out all sides of any issue. Keeping 
lots of breathing room in societal dialogic space will provide the success of Nicaraguan 
democracy. If the economy contracts further and more media outlets are closed, the 
representations of Nicaraguan identity will either fmd other outlets like Zimmerman 
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outlined, or society will become as limited by the rule of economics as with the rule of an 
authoritarian or communist regime. If there is another revolution, be it linked to 
frustration with economic destitution enforced by global exploitation or dissatisfaction 
with government corruption, it is hard to imagine what it will look like. More 
revolutions, despite continuing hard times, do not seem to be looming in the future. Latin 
America is nearlyl5 years out of its era of revolution and war, and people do not want to 
live under those conditions again. 
The Nicaraguan journalist, though he or she has a difficult job for little pay like 
almost every job in Nicaragua right now, is not in any danger of disappearing. Nor is 
Nicaraguan identity going to suddenly dissipate. The duty of the Nicaraguan press is to 
reflect the shifting, contradicting and developing identity of Nicaragua, and through the 
consistent spread of information economic stability, representative democracy and 
healthy civil society will be cultivated. 
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Nicararguan Exchanges, 2002 
It is pitch black on the island of 
Ometepe by 7 p.m. There are no street 
lights and the bus slowly swims through 
the potholes. The 12 kilometers to the 
next town might as well be 100. From 
the bus windows we can see into the one-
room houses along the road. The 
windows are open holes to the hot night, 
letting in the sounds of the jungle, the 
neighbors and the stray dogs. In one 
house we pass there are ten people 
gathered around a TY. In Nicaragua, it's 
not an uncommon scene. 
Nicaragua is the second poorest 
nation in the Western Hemisphere after 
Haiti. Its recent history includes frequent natural 
disasters, political corruption and civil war. In 1969 
the Sandanistarevolution overthrew Dictator Anastasio 
Somoza, who left the country with $3.5 million in the 
national treasury and $1.6 billion in foreign debt. 
The Sandanistas started from scratch, 
emphasizing popular participation, increasing social 
services and land redistribution. U.S. President Carter 
originally supported 1he Sandanista revolution, but the 
U.S. changed its policies while Reagan was in office, 
sponsoring 1he Contra rebels with more than 100 million 
dollars in training and weaponry. Nicaragua lost an 
estimated 20,000-40,000 people in the civil war. In a 
country with population hovering around :five million, 
the devastation reached everyone. 
As soon as some progress was made in 
reconstruction after the civil war, Hurricane Mitch hit 
in 1998 leaving 3,000 people dead, 30,000 displaced, 
and many damaged crops, roads and bridges. Most 
repair and permanent relocation projects are still 
pending, forgotten by the government The capital city 
ofManagua still hasn't been rebuilt fium an earthquake 
in 1972. Statistically, times are only hard and harder. 
•I 
• l 
I went to Nicaragua in January of2002 with 
.another student, April Conway. When our plane flew 
in over Managua the country was darlc except for long 
thin lines of fire winding through the green black. My 
seatmate, a Nicaraguan banker, told me they were 
burning sugarcane. When the plane landed everyone 
clapped. We went into the small airport to claim our 
bags and were immediately pushed out by the crowd 
into the hot street full of eager cab drivers. 
I became interested in Nicaragua for 
"typical" reasons: the near success of a people's 
revolution and the devastating U.S. involvement. 
I came to Nicaragua romantic about the 
implications of the Sandanistas. I wanted to see 
if the legacy of Sandanista ideology somehow gave 
people more tools to construct enriched civic life 
even in the face of widespread poverty. What I 
found out, whether left over from the Sandanista 
movement or not, was the importance of operations 
that function at a community level and how 
individuals make grass roots projects happen. 
Through our hostel the Quaker House in 
Managua, part of a larger Quaker volunteer project 
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called ProNica, we were able to network interviews 
and contacts. We met American development 
workers, people from the hostel's neighborhood Las 
Brisas, and local Sandanista party leaders. We 
looked through the phone book, walked the 
unwalkable city, and read everything we could get 
our hands on. 
The Sandanista (Frente Sandanista 
Liberacion Nacional) party is definitely a visible 
part of daily life. Their party colors, black and 
red, are painted on the bottoms of telephone poles, 
left over from the past two elections. The FSLN 
logo is across building walls and a red 
meetinghouse is near the center of every town. 
This year Daniel Ortega, ·the party's candidate 
for the recent and the previous presidential election, 
added a new color: hot pink. His platform wanted 
nothing of the dark Sandanista memories, he was 
aiming more along the lines of peace and love. The 
hot pink banners are still painted on many buildings. 
In the park in front of the National Museum 
and Congress, the FSLN flags wave next to the blue 
and white flags from the Partido Liberal 
Conservador, or PLC. The country is divided 
almost 50/50 and almost everyone somehow 
participates politically. In the last election 90% of 
the people voted, but polls showed that people 
remained undecided up until voting day. Enrique 
Bolanos of the PLC won by 53%. Ortega 
recognized his loss and conceded peacefully saying, 
"we will continue to work to support democracy 
and its institutions." 
Important to understanding Nicaragua is tO 
realize that a vote for president is a vote for stability. 
People were afraid to vote for Daniel Ortega, 
because to vote for socialism is to vote to upset the 
U.S., and because in post-Sept. 11 uncertainty, a 
socialist can be easily fabricated into a terrorist. 
To aid his campaign, Bolanos brought up 
past Sandanista party ties to Gadhafi in Libya and 
guerilla leader Tirafijo in Colombia. But what 
alienated his supporters were the molestation 
charges brought against Ortega by his stepdaughter 
years before. The scandal exposed a man 
twisted and power hungry in his own 
domestic life and broke the trust of even 
his most loyal followers. 
However, Bolanos' record wasn't 
clean either. Bolanos was vice-president 
for Aleman, a president nationally hated 
for his massive amounts of corruption. 
The country's political divide, in a 
sense, defines Nicaragua. Families and 
neighborhoods are at odds, and whether 
someone is hired for a job can depend on 
the applicant's politics. Many social 
services and unions (those remaining) are 
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historically Sandanista. And the key representation 
of democracy, the media, is particularly politically 
polarized. 
By asking which party someone supports, 
a Nicaraguan's choice of newspaper is pretty 
obvious. One could simply ask what newspaper 
someone reads to figure out his or her party 
preferance. The newspaper venders that typically 
wait at stoplights and then push the papers into 
the open taxicab windows are usually selling one 
of two papers: La Prensa, Nicaragua's more 
conservative and economically focused daily, or 
Nuevo Diario, the less circulated but popular 
socialist press. Managua has five daily papers, 
impressive for a city of about one million with one-
third of the population illeterate. 
I was interested in newspapers because I 
wanted to see how Nicaragua represents itself and 
if newspapers reflected the realities ofNicaraguans. 
But in interviewing I found that asking about the 
"spread of information" and people's newspaper 
preferences made for a short and abstract 
conversation since I wasn't only talking to 
Nicaraguan journalists. 
It was more immediate and satisfying to 
fmd out what daily life in Nicaragua was like, how 
history has affected the present and how grass . 
roots work and NGOs function. 
April and I traveled through neighborhoods 
and communities, essentially meeting social 
workers and asking them about their 
work. My project changed, went 
outward to looking at different forms of 
communication in different parts of 
society. It was enough of a learning 
process just to be someone trying to 
communicate with Nicaraguans I met. 
But as I thought about the media 
as an actor in society, I realized that part 
of my interest hinged on my own 
conviction that a healthy civil society 
includes effective channels of 
communication within the country. 
How was information spread? How 
fast? What sources did people trust and 
why? 
What I was daily learning was that 
communication is organic, it is word of mouth, and 
it springs from and helps build community. The 
community level of society is important because 
that is where the real development work through 
training and education is happening. 
Can a unified community build identity? 
.I met Jaeda Harmon, FUNDECI 
coordinator, on our pilgrimage to Casa Ben Linder, 
a house dedicated in memory of an engineer from 
the United States who was the only U.S. citizen 
killed by Contra soldiers. 
The house is covered in murals of images 
from his life. Ben Linder liked to dress up as a 
clown and ride his unicycle at Sandanista rallies or 
through the streets for the children where he 
worked. His death brought significant attention to 
the realities of United States involvement in 
Nicaragua in the 1980s. 
FUNDECI, Fundacion Nicaragi.iense pro 
Desorollo Comuntario Integral (Nicaraguan 
Foundation for Integrative Community 
Development) and several other organizations use 
the house as an office. FUNDECI used to work 
with several neighborhoods, but after a few years 
realized they had spread them8elves too thin. Rather 
than trying to support 53 of Managua's poorest 
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barrios, they worked for a sustained presence in a 
few neighborhoods. 
One of their projects is in Nueva Vida in 
Memorial Sandino, a relatively new sprawl of 
impoverished people not far outside of Managua. 
The area became a neighborhood after Hurricane 
Mitch displaced thousands of people in 1998 and 
. the government set up temporary camps. 
Except after the creation of this makeshift 
city people were left to fend for themselves. Phone 
lines, electricity, and decent roads still have not 
been run out to the neighborhood. If there are 
few jobs in central Managua, there are few to 
none in peripheral Memorial Sandino. The 
streets that lead out to Memorial Sandino are 
unsafe besides being unbearably dusty in the 
dry swnmer and muddy pits in the rainy season. 
In her work as Memorial Sandino 
Project Coordinator, Harmon plans 
neighborhood events, supports a community 
preschool, and has founded a women's 
leadership group. Raising social consciousness 
is part of the women's leadership training. 
Part of the objective of the group is to 
learn technical skills, so Harmon took a survey 
to find out what the women wanted to know . 2 
how to do. Their answers were almost exclusively 
cooking, beauty school and sewing lessons, things 
that can be done in the home. 
Harmon says for some of these women, half 
the accomplishment is getting permission to leave 
the house from their husbands. She tells me about 
asking the women if they would be interested in 
other kinds of job training, maybe something less 
domestic, but they were not interested. 
For Nicaraguans the range of jobs is so 
limited that gaining employment and income is 
enough of a battle. Unemployment is officially 30 
percent according to the World Bank, but several 
Nicaraguans I met said it was closer to 70 percent. 
Harmon, from the U.S., is in her mid 20s. 
She has small features and wears dangly earrings. 
The longer she stays in Nicaragua, the more she 
learns how to narrow the focus of the community 
organization to strengthen the effects of its work. 
She has been in Nicaragua two years and will soon 
go back to the United States. 
Speaking of her development work with the 
neighborhood organization and the four other 
NGOs in the area Harmon says, "The idea is 
somehow to create ongoing coordination and have 
meetings to avoid duplicating efforts and avoiding 
the people of the community feeling divided 
loyalty. All the NGOs agree to [work to] strengthen 
R!llt? 
community, and to do that by standihg behind the 
neighborhood organization." 
The neighborhood organization has 
become a space all local groups can use. 
Communication between other organizations is 
mostly word of mouth, phone calls and meetings. 
Harmon says she used to do a lot of walking and 
talking, but with the growth of the neighborhood 
association she can now let its channels act as her 
publicity. 
Because the Nicaraguan state government 
is unreliable, work at the grass roots level is 
invaluable. But NGOs must be careful because their 
work is seen as subversive by the government, and 
without government support they cannot do their 
projects. 
"The problem is Nicaragua is so 
politicized," Harmon said, ''we are trying to build 
a community vision as opposed to a political party 
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vision." There is a difference between room for 
political space for a diversity of groups and the 
forced politicization of all groups in the public 
~phere. Right now Nicaraguan society operates 
m between those two catagories. 
. Harmon is working to involve the people 
m Memorial Sandino in improving their own 
lives, no party strings attached. FUNDECI is 
they can work together and build upon each other's 
accomplishments. 
Looking back, Harmon's work was really 
helping to build community and individual identity: 
she is empowering the women of her group with 
skills so they can make their own opportunities, 
but also so they can get to know themselves, which 
eventually helps to strengthen community identity. 
Communicating 
social change 
0 n e 
working to make a 
free non-political 
neighborhood space, 
but community 
work in Nicaragua is 
rooted in Sandanista 
tradition. Not 
enough time has 
passed for the 
government to ideo-
logically separate 
social work and 
civic development 
from Sandanismo. -----
------------i-_ 
Nicaraguan April and 
I were lucky to meet, 
Horold Urbina Cruz, 
who goes by Shaggy, 
is an organizer for the 
Movimiento Juvenil 
Para la Promocion y 
Defensa de los 
Derechos Humanos, Harmon's 
subtler, overarching work, is to change an 
entrenched leadership style left over from intense 
political tradition. 
She says, "Historically, leaders are 
political leaders, which make for an authoritarian 
model. The point is not just getting people to 
show up to meetings, but to take on responsibility. 
The struggle is for a collective leadership model." 
Some of what she tells me is about her 
own leadership development, about working with 
others, delegating and cultural complications. 
Underneath her words I can tell she is thinking 
about how things will go after she has gone back 
to the U.S. Who will do the work and how? 
How does someone give so much of themselves 
and then just walk away? I guess she will just 
move on, keeping Nicaragua in the back of her 
memory. 
From Harmon I got a sense of what the 
work of community organizing entails, as well 
as the importance of NGOs communicating so 
the Youth Movement 
for the Promotion of Human Rights. 
His work, at its core, is also identity work: 
strengthening grass roots groqps and teaching 
people their individual rights. He told us a slogan 
his organization uses, "A right not defended is a 
right that may as well be lost." He said most people 
attend school until about eighth grade, then people 
stop because it is no longer free so the general 
population is uneducated in what human rights 
actually are. 
He said "If people have no chance to learn 
about human rights they have no chance to defend 
them. There is a problem with the national police, 
no one is watching to supervise what they do." 
His organization holds workshops about 
twice a month. "Poor equals guilty and youth 
equals suspects. Even gangsters have the right to 
know their rights when it comes to the police. The 
main problem is unemployment, around 70 percent, 
and 40 percent [of the population] lives in extreme 
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poverty. People do not realize that they have a 
right to education and health." 
Shaggy also teaches English classes at the 
community center at night. We accompanied him 
to class to help students with pronunciation. We 
walked with him for what seemed like miles, 
through three different barrios finally to a room 
that faced the street next to a church. The room, 
lit up like a stage to the dark neighborhood, had 
bookshelves full of hundreds of cheap English 
romance novels. 
About seven men came for the lesson, 
distracted or tired after the long day, their clothes 
still ironed and crisp after the day's heat. They 
had no pencils or paper until Shaggy passed them 
out. We spent an hour working on one exercise: a 
fifty-word conversation of a woman and her seat 
partner on a plane to Miami. 
Afterwards, the room was used as a dance 
studio. Three girls followed the steps of one 
male instructor while the neighborhood watched. 
Shaggy offered us the chance to stay and dance 
and we quickly said no. Our different faces and 
clothes made us stand out anyways; we didn't 
need to dance poorly in the lit room for 
spectators. 
Then we walked with him back through 
the streets to the hostel, over the broken 
sidewalks, through the traffic in air that was 
finally more or less cool. We walked back with 
all of the men from the class, and realized that 
they were all one group of friends. Before class 
started, we had gone by each of their houses to 
pick them up individually until the whole class was 
walking together. 
Shaggy considers his work a moviemento 
communal, a bigger community movement. "In 
every neighborhood we visit people in their own 
houses and invite them to come [to the party 
meeting, or English class]. It is the only way to 
get the message. Sometimes we use media or 
publicity, but it is not so easy to get to a TV channel 
and go on the air. There are a few radio stations 
[that] let us on the air." 
It is also hard for his organizations to get 
attention from the press because then the 
newspapers could lose government advertising. 
"Right now we are negotiating with a newspaper 
about an article about human rights violations, we 
are still waiting. There is a clear polarization among 
the population; the media is divided as well. Nuevo 
Diario is the only paper that supports the left wing 
movement; the rest of the newspapers would never 
publish an article against the government. La 
Prensa was used by the CIA in the '80s. In theory 
laws are fact, but in practice they are not happening. 
The main investor in publicity is the government. 
The majority of enterprises are linked to the 
government, so if a newspaper or the media writes 
against the government they lose support." 
From Shaggy we learned that 
communication mostly works at a micro level. "AU 
organizations know each other, members are from 
communities, neighbors." I told Shaggy that I 
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could romanticize the fact that so much information 
was spread word of mouth. He looked at me like 
he couldn't understand what I was talking about. I 
saw the closeness of organizations and citizens as 
an advantage. In the U.S. word of mouth is more 
limited, people stay in their houses, companies fax 
things back and forth. 
"Communication [in Nicaragua] is 
something difficult," Shaggy said. "When I worked 
here [at an organization with a phone] it was easy 
to call a radio station and 
denounce something. Most 
people have no radio, no TV and 
are always depending on 
personal communication and 
always visiting the 
neighborhood," he said. 
But by not being able to 
easily spread information and 
get attention, the Nicaraguan 
people and the government miss 
messages that are important for 
them to hear. 
Shaggy said, ''We could 
contact the deputies in 
parliament and make proposals 
using the FSLN as a mediator 
and arrange a meeting to 
propose what we want to do. In 
this so-called Western democracy we can talk to 
the government, visit the ministry of education or 
talk to the PLC, which in fact is very difficult to 
do. Unfortunately for the ordinary person the idea 
of democracy is to vote and after the election they 
do not pay attention." 
Underdevelopment and cultural 
misunderstanding 
While in Nicaragua, and more so after 
coming home, I've thought about why people 
choose to work for different causes. Why do people 
work with troubled teens as opposed to inside an 
air-conditioned bank? What exactly makes people 
dedicate themselves to something bigger, to 
communities or ideologies? Religion, the appeal 
for something different, pleasure in sacrifice or 
hardship? Maybe people come when the problems 
are so big they can't be ignored anymore, or people 
come because something inside them makes them 
want to help other people. Some people stay. I 
especially thought about why people choose harsh 
conditions when I met North Americans living and 
working in Nicaragua. 
April and I soon realized in our travels that 
all NGOs, especially ones with foreigners, knew 
each other. The longer we 
stayed in Managua, the smaller 
the city became. Through 
Harmon and Shaggy we heard 
of the Jubilee House, a 
commune of Americans 
working to help set up 
cooperatives and coordinate 
volunteers out near Ciudad 
Sandino. 
The community was on 
property that was once owned 
by a relative of Somo2'.8. There 
was a large sunkeri. pool and 
several old, giant birdcages 
scattered around the property. 
The estate had definitely once 
been grand but now it was a 
work in progress, a bizarre time 
capsule in the middle of nowhere. The town was 
half a mile away and dry empty fields surrounded 
the property. 
About 50 yards to the west of the house 
was a cooperative, started by the community, 
making cement blocks. The blocks were for a 
building next to the house that was half built, soon 
to be a woodshop for a carpenter's cooperative. 
In another cooperative closer to the road, a dozen 
women worked in a simple building sewing ethically 
made organic t-shirts which the Jubilee House sold 
on the international market. 
I talked to Sara Woodard, a Jubilee house 
community member, about i:b.e cooperatives and 
"communication." She was :from the U.S., 40-
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Listening to her experience was partly 
listening to a U.S. citizen's work ethic confront 
' another culture. But the work of the Jubilee House 
was giving Nicaraguans tools to support 
themselves. The cooperatives they support are by 
definition owned by the workers, a practice of the 
collective leadership model. 
something, in shorts and covered in dust and 
cobwebs from wiring phone lines through the attic. 
She said the Jubilee House had been there 
eight years without a phone line. After pestering 
the government repeatedly for months and months, 
on the day that we visited, they were finally wiring 
for the one slot they had just been allowed on the 
circuit. 
Jubilee House had originally appealed for 
six phone lines, one for the house, the business, 
and a few for the other cooperatives and farmers 
in the area. After Woodard's persistence the phone 
company Enetel had somehow magically found 
room for them on the grid. 
"To work here," said Woodard, "you must 
assume that nothing has really gone through. You 
get wrong numbers and your emails don't mail, but 
they don't bounce back. The dilemma is whether 
to call back and harass, or is their silence a way of 
saying no? It makes life complicated, just when 
you think you got a system that works some leg of 
the communication breaks down. To ask when will 
it be ready in the States means saying what [the 
people asking] want to hear. No one is lying [when 
they say no], it is incorrect to say lying, its rude for 
someone to say no, they're not able to do it. We 
are communicating with people with no phone, no 
mail. We want to tell them there is a buyer for their 
sesame, but they are two days out in the boonies. 
It is hard to adapt first world schedules to people 
who say we'll come in when the mud is not too 
deep and then two days later they go away." 
The Jubilee House also serves as a work 
camp for foreign volunteers who pay to stay in the 
bunkhouses and do construction on the property 
or in town. The Jubilee House functions 
collectively on a domestic level as well. The 
North American residents live communally, pool 
their income and help raise each other's children. 
The witness as a political actor 
The other organization from the U.S. I 
talked to, Witness for Peace, particularly interested 
me because I knew their mission was to be 
politically independent and to act as a "witness," 
as observers of the government. They especially 
monitor human rights violations, and then report 
what they find to their base in the United States. 
WFP has an office in Managua as ·well as 
Cuba, Colombia and Mexico. Their work originally 
began in 1983 when they first started bringing 
people to Nicaragua to relate back to the U.S. an 
alternate vision of Reagan's campaign. 
WFP used personal testimonies and photos 
of kids hurt by land mines to show the U.S. what 
their tax dollars for "freedom fighters" were really 
doing. WFP's principle goal during the war was 
to be a physical presence in the communities. Just 
by being visible in the neighborhoods U.S. citizens 
protected Nicaraguans because it was not in the 
Contra's best interest to kill the North Americans. 
At one point there were 40 North Americans with 
WFP in Nicaragua. 
North Americans were relatively safe 
during the civil war. There was one incident where 
the Contras kidnapped a WFP worker for 24 hours. 
The Contras killed only one U.S. citizen, Ben 
Linder, though they killed over 30 international 
workers after the start of the civil war. 
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In the current political climate WFF has a 
relatively low profile. "We consider ourselves 
support for Nicaragua, to focus on corruption and 
the U.S. government, to bring truth to the U.S. 
where the power is," said Melinda St. Louis, 
International WFP 
team member and 
labor liaison. "We put 
the human face on 
policy, on economics, 
debt and war. We go 
to the campo and visit 
the peasant farmer." 
WFP's work 
as an independent 
reporter or watchdog 
means it looks to 
many sources to fmd 
the full picture. 
St.Louis told me about WFP'S work contacting 
unions, the ministry of labor, human rights 
organizations, lawyers and the U.S. Embassy to 
see the different sides of the issues and find a 
middle ground. "We get two newspapers, Nuevo 
Diario and La Prensa. We read the same story in 
both of them and the truth is somewhere in the 
middle." 
Part of the Witness for Peace mission is to 
bring information back to the United States. They 
publish a newsletter, work on larger documents and 
make presentations. Most recently they were trying 
to bring attention to U.S. involvement in the 
Nicaraguan presidential elections. 
"As an activist the focus is on the press in 
the United States," said St Louis. "The [U.S.] 
media plays a strong role in [U.S.] attitudes, and 
through our work we hope to bring the wisdom of 
the people here [in Nicaragua] to the people in the 
U.S. Change in U.S. policy would help Nicaragua. 
Even if the Nicaraguan government wanted to help 
the people, they have little space to move. The 
U.S. economic model says export, not educate. I 
believe in the good in the people of the U.S., but 
they are ignorant and there is a concentrated effort 
to keep them that way." 
Currently, WFP's first priority is to lead and 
facilitate delegations, groups of about 15, usuallly 
from the U.S., that visit for a political and cultural 
education. The groups hear Nicaraguans speak, 
visit different representative neighborhoods and 
then analyze and 
reflect as a group. 
WFP's work 
seems to bridge two 
communication 
models: media 
presentation of 
information and 
community 
networking within the 
United States by word 
of mouth taken back 
by the delegations. 
As a student I 
identified with WFP because I was conducting my 
own investigation. It was important for me to 
understand different versions of Nicaragua so I 
could take different sides of the story with me back 
to the U.S. 
Young people and the legacy of the draft 
April and I were always meeting 
Nicaraguans, but the best contacts came from 
English speaking ex-patriots who helped us set up 
interviews. We interviewed two teenage boys, 
Felipe Antonio Mantaluan Duffis, 19, and Jorge 
Alberto Obando Rocha, 17. We had met Felipe's 
father at a reggae concert (he was the lead singer) 
through Lillian Hall, the coordinator of ProNica, 
and he had graciously volunteered his son and his 
son's friend. 
The two boys rode up to our hostel on little 
bikes on their way to a party dressed like they were 
in Los Angeles; Nike and Fila head to toe. We 
were dressed in tank tops and sarongs, sweating 
and socially inappropriate in the heat. 
They were a bit surprised to be asked about 
their political beliefs, but we asked them about their 
families, schools, and what music they liked. They 
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considered themselves middle or upper middle 
class. 
They said they heard about news and 
current events from their family, friends, 
newspapers and school. They said they thought 
their school history 
books gave a fair 
portrayal of the 
truth. 
''The books 
are written from 
those who lived 
through the time," 
said Duffis. "Big 
[Sandanista] trucks 
came to my house 
and took away my 
uncle and cousin, 
they took away all 
the youth and it 
was not voluntary, 
that is why people left Nicaragua." Nevertheless 
Duffis 's family is still Sandanista. 
Rocha is for the PLC, or Liberales. Their 
party lines came out immediately. Rocha's family 
story is similar to Duffis, everyone in Nicaragua 
can tell a story about their family members being 
drafted for the war. 
"It was just people following something 
they did not know, [the Sandanistas] would do 
some traps, say there was going to be a party and 
then carry people off to be soldiers and not tell 
their families," said Rocha. "I am for the PLC, the 
Sandanistas were the worst of Nicaragua, they 
corrupted the country." 
At the height of the civil war, the combined 
size of both the Contras and the Sandanistas was 
300,000, over 10 percent of the country's 
population. There are a lot of bureaucratic reasons 
why the Sandanistas were not re-elected in the 
pivotal election of 1990. The tiered socialist system 
of the party had lost touch with the general 
population, and therefore the Sandanistas were 
overconfident in regards to Ortega's voter support. 
This lost Ortega the election because the he did 
not feel the need to repeal the draft. Thousands of 
teenage voters were waiting to hear otherwise. 
The voting age in Nicaragua is 16. "It is 
very important young people pay attention. I hope 
to be a professional and !mow what was happening 
in my country," said Duffis. 
Sandanista 
loyalty and the 
hearts of 
Nicaraguans 
The draft 
will take a few 
generations to 
leave collective 
memory. It always 
came up when I 
talkedwith Nica-
raguans about the 
war. 
April and I spoke with Manuel Aburto, a 
San-danista, on the southwestern coast of 
Nicaragua at one of the most idyllic beac~es I've 
ever seen. Aburto told us that getting a visa to the 
United States was impossible for him because he 
is an independent truck driver and has no proof 
that he has a business, a visa requirement. 
Though Aburto is Sandanista, he thinks 
President Bolanos will be OK because he will work 
to increase the workforce. Aburto told us he was 
Sandanista because he was Sandanista when he was 
young. During the war he was in the reserves 
because he was older than the draft age. 
Aburto said he is still Sandanista because 
he saw the party lift up the country, so l S years 
later he is still with them. This reasoning made 
sense to us, loyalty does not change overnight, and 
loyalty does not mean complete agreement. 
His political concerns were also practical: 
the external debt and market credibility. He 
thought that better relations with the U.S. would 
bring more market confidence. 
Aburto's mind was sharp, his clothes well 
ironed, and he was patient with the language 
barrier. He didn't seem to mind us asking 
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questions about his personal history. His son sat 
next to him, his back to the beach. He looked about 
20, and was not interested in us or our questions 
at all. 
It was ironic that asking personal and 
controversial questions in another language was 
easier than speaking with someone in English. That 
ease was because I had no hope of implying the 
right nuance of political correctness or politeness. 
Aburto told April and we were as tourists, turistas, 
hope for the country because we would bring the 
heart of the Nicaraguans back with us to the United 
States, and then more tourists would come to 
Nicaragua. 
April and I were staying at an "eco-lodge" 
in San Juan del Sur. It was set between two coves 
and a rock cliff that jutted into the ocean and curved 
out like a question mark. The white sand turned to 
rolling brown jungle. A family of 12 howler 
monkeys lived on the property. They kept us up at 
night, at one point it seemed like they were on the 
roof of our tent. 
The owner of the lodge, a quick-witted 
Australian ex-patriot named Paul, helped us set up 
the interview with Aburto. Paul had laughed at us 
when we told him we had to leave his paradise to 
study, and then he told us the history of the site. 
Before his ownership the property had been 
developed as a place to train Sandanista guerillas. 
Paul said the lodge was one of Daniel 
Ortega's favorite vacation spots. Ortega had 
booked it for the week after the election, but didn't 
end up vacationing because he lost. Paul said he 
knew Ortega and his family fairly well. Our 
mouths dropped open and he laughed at us again. 
He said Ortega, who has run for office four times 
with the ardent belief that the presidency of 
Nicaragua is his destiny, is just a normal guy. 
There were people from all over the world 
staying at the lodge. We talked with other students 
from the U.S., Dutch women just out of school, 
and an Italian man. Everyone would come sit on 
the sand to watch the sunset and then stay up half 
the night talking about where to go, what to seen, 
and what to read. The best travel spots were found 
out by word of mouth. Everyone was hungry to 
know the that lay off the beaten track. 
Women, men and schools 
Most of the Nicaraguans we talked with 
were IQ.en. April and I were constantly meeting 
men and boys in the streets wherever we went. 
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The story of women in Nicaragua is hard 
for me to think about. As a single, young woman 
from the U.S. walking around asking everyone 
questions, I had a very different world role than 
the local women. 
The country, as I've said, is void of 
employment and fuU of men without purpose. The 
·women have fewer options, mostly housecleaning 
and making food to sell on the street The rate of 
childbirth is nearly four live births per woman, and 
for every man who comes home at night and 
provides for his family, there are five who don't. 
The Sandanista promised increased 
opportunities for women after the revolution, but the 
resources of the country were drained by the Contra 
campaign. Women were guerillas and had high 
positions in the revolutionary government, but 
there were no real changes in authoritarian 
machista ideas about women. Now, since times 
are less tumultuous, and jobs are hard to find, 
women have fallen back into traditional roles. 
I was lucky to get to know Panchita Fletes, 
the housekeeper of the hostel in Managua we 
stayed in for two weeks. She had been working at 
the Quaker House for eight years. She was friendly, 
patient, and used a hose to clean the tile floor inside 
the house because the water evaporates so fast. 
I talked to Panchita about men, tabloids, 
and the past and future of Nicaragua. She is a 
single mother with two children. Her husband left 
her two years ago. She says she is lucky she only 
has two children because she can just afford to pay 
75 cordobas (about $5) a month for them to go to 
school. If she had five children it would be 
impossible. Both of her boys are teenagers. She 
said they are still going to school because there is 
no work. Panchita said the men of this country 
take no responsibility for their kids and there is no 
other help for women. 
OfNicaragua she said, "estamos mal, "we 
are bad. It was such a simple phrase said 
immediately and bluntly, to hear it hurt the way it 
hurts when a friend is admitting to you that she 
believes herself a failure, except this was collective 
failure. 
She said, "Esta paiz nunca va adelante 
porque corrupcion, es triste," this country is never 
going to go forward because of corruption, it is 
sad. Panchita used the example from Hurricane 
Mitch when millions of dollars in international aid 
was given to Nicaragua, but never reached the 
people for which it was intended. 
Panchita believes Daniel Ortega lost the 
election because of his affair with his stepdaughter, 
and because U.S. terrorism made people afraid to 
vote for him. She said during the time the 
Sandanistas were in power, in the war, people had 
to have food ration cards. People were afraid 
because there was no work, they were hungry, and 
there was nothing to buy. 
When Somoza was overthrown, she said, 
everyone was happy and the country was at peace. 
She didn't think the bad times were the 
Sandanistas' fault, but because no support came 
from other countries. She said Nicaragua would 
never advance without help from other countries. 
Panchita thinks people are confused about 
the political differance between left and right 
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because they can still remember how it felt to live 
under the threat of the draft. 
I talked to Panchita in the hostel living 
room in whicker chairs while she was eating lunch. 
She was happy to be asked what she knew, to be 
listened to. I was more comfortable with her than 
I had been in my other interviews. I had been 
staying at the hostel for a few weeks and we had 
become friends. She could talk to me about 
Nicaragua and I could ask her questions because 
we were both interested in one another. 
The places we dldn 't go 
After April and I were back in the United 
States three weeks, we heard via email that the 
hostel had been robbed while Panchita was 
working. She had run out into the street and the 
robbers had beaten her with a 
shovel so she was taking a few 
weeks off to recover. I hoped 
she was not too hurt to keep 
working so her boys can stay 
in school. 
Throughout our three 
weeks in Nicaragua we almost 
always felt safe. But there are 
many places we did not go, 
markets or neighborhoods far 
past where the dirt roads 
ended We traveled with men 
a lot, did not go out much at 
night. In the evenings, we 
were overwhelmed and exhausted. 
We cooked eggs and potatoes or went out 
for beans and rice, then read books about the history 
of the war until we fell asleep. Most nights stayed 
hot. We took cold showers and did not complain 
because afterwards we were immediately hot again. 
It was January, we couldn't imagine how people 
could be in the city for the dry season in May. 
No matter where we were in the country, 
we were kept up all night by dogs barking, people 
fighting, roosters, sometimes the wind. The nights 
were full of murky dreams, bug bites and sweat. 
When I woke up in the morning, I usually felt like 
I had lived another life while I slept. 
While we were in Nicaragua, April and I 
caught a lot of buses, taxis, a feny, speedboats, 
several canoes, one horse cart, and sometimes even 
hitchhiked. Then we got on a plane, flew over Cuba 
and the long fmgers of swampland off Florida and 
landed in Miami where the sun was setting far 
sooner than my body anticipated. Much of the 
airport staff spoke only Spanish and people wore 
fashions I had never seen in L.A. 
Now that I have a chance to look back, I 
think about the position I put myself in as a traveler, 
but also as a student. Inside of me is this will to do 
the best project, to fmd out all the information, to 
take knowledge. I think about all the conversations 
and interviews I had while I was there. Was I taking 
....... 
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from Nicaragua? To interview is to take people's 
time, then to take their ideas back home. But by 
the nature of conversation, I was giving simply by 
participating. Even ifl did not say much, my body 
language, my attentiveness, left an impression. The 
people I talked to did it out of human will to 
communicate, maybe with a sense of an 
international dialog between the U.S. and 
Nicaragua. 
I started this project wanting to know how 
important newspapers were to the formation of 
culture and the spread of information. Instead I 
found a whole world of interactions. Culture is 
formed by what is exchanged: news, events, ideas, 
books, and people are always birthing themselves 
and new identities are always emerging. 
Whether I was hanging out in the street with 
the neighborhood kids, or talking to other 
international travelers, I learned 
more about Nicaragua and human 
nature than I could have read in a 
document. Now, writing this, I am 
responding to what I have learned. 
I have the responsibility to put it 
out into the world, to continue the 
dialog. 
People communicate and 
share all over the world, and their 
culture and access to resources 
affects that exchange. In Nicaragua 
news is spread by word of mouth, 
especially within neighborhoods. 
In the U.S. people aren't as close 
to each other, but there is a developed 
infrastructure with more civic spaces for 
dialog. It is not a matter of better or worse 
systems, it is just how it is. 
Right now times are hard in Nicaragua 
Hope was something that existed when there 
was a revolution, after there were peace talks. 
Now people are tired of hoping. There is so 
much work to be done to make the 
infrastructure and the government more 
effective. The harsh economic conditions 
have created a space for the world market, the 
media and the U.S. to enter and do business, 
essentially exploiting Nicaragua. Concerning the 
increasing exposure to world media I am less 
worried. Nicaraguans have a rich culture and 
history which alters international influences to 
make them a part of Nicaragua's own complex 
identiy. 
My exchange with Nicaragua is the positive 
side of a globalization. My trip allowed me to see 
myself in a global context, not just as a privileged 
person, but simply as a person who is part of the 
world. This is the beginning of a longer study of 
communic~tion and exchange. Because I was able 
to recognize the many ways information is 
communicated in Nicaragua, I have a fresh 
perspective on the vehicles and spaces for 
communication in my own community and 
country. 
